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IN THE SUPREME COURT Of THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY ) 
and YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COM-
PANY, INC., 
Plaintiffs, \ Case 
STATE T=~ COMMISSION, 1
/ No. 8383 
Defendant. 1 
f(J£1'1.Y 
PLAINTIFFS'/ BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The defendant, in its brief, agreed with the 
statement of facts set forth in plaintiffs' brief and 
did not modify plaintiffs' statement of facts or enlarge 
it. The facts involved are not, then, in dispute. 
Plaintiffs have moved to strike portions of de-
fendant's brief which plaintiffs claim is outside the 
evidence. This brief will discuss defendant's brief as 
if the portions complained of were stricken. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE SALES TAX ACT RENDERS TAXABLE THE 
SALE OF SERVICES ONLY WHEN THOSE SERVICES ARE 
RENDERED BY CERTAIN PUBLIC UTILITIES NAMED IN 
THE ACT. NO SUCH SERVICES ARE INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE. 
POINT II 
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT CITES AS AUTHORITY 
FOR THE TAXATION OF THE Sl\L~ OF SERVICES, CER-
TAIN REGULATIONS WHICH DcJ,>1rHEIR TERMS, LEVY 
A TAX UPON THE SALE OF SERVICES. THESE ARE THE 
VERY REGULATIONS WHOSE VALIDITY IS CALLED 
INTO QUESTION BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
·P..OINT III 
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT IT HAS 
NOT LEVIED A TAX UPON SERVICES IN THE INSTANT 
CASE, WHEREAS, IT HAS IN FACT DONE SO. 
POINT IV 
IN RELATION TO THE TAXATION OF CHARGES 
MADE UNDER "RE-VvRITES," DEFENDANT SEEKS TO 
A VOID THE CLEAR MEANING AND INTENT OF ITS 
STIPULATION. 
POINTV 
PLAINTIFFS AGREE WITH THE PROPOSITION SET 
FORTH AS THE DEFENDANT'S POINT III. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SALES TAX ACT RENDERS TAXABLE THE 
SALE OF SERVICES ONLY WHEN THOSE SERVICES ARE 
RENDERED BY CERTAIN PUBLIC UTILITIES NAMED IN 
THE ACT. NO SUCH SERVICES ARE INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE. 
Under Point I of its brief (page 3) defendant 
states that the excise tax on retail sales is not limited 
to a tax on the sale of tangible personal property. 
This is true. Only the portion of the Sales Tax Act 
concerned in this case, Sec. 59-15-4 (a), U.C.A., 1953, 
is so limited. Portions of the Sales Tax Act which 
have no bearing whatever ori this case do tax things 
other than the retail sale of tangible personal prop-
erty. For example, Sec. 59-15-4 (b) levies a tax on 
the sale of services by certain public utilities, Sec. 
59-1 S-4 (c) levies a tax on the full price of meals fur-
nished, and Sec. 59-15-4 (d) levies a tax on the sale 
of admfssion to places of amusement, entertainment 
or recreation. Since none of the above cited sections 
of the Sales Tax Act have any bearing whatever on 
the case at bar, plaintiffs did not feel it necessary to 
refer to them in its argument, or to modify its argu-
ments or statements in consideration of those sections. 
Defendant takes issue with plaintiff's statement 
that the proposition is· elementary that the Sales Tax 
Act does not tax the sale of services, and cites in sup-
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port of its position certain references in the act to the 
taxation of services. Again, it did not seem necessary 
to plaintiffs to modify their statement that the sale 
of services is not taxable by saying "except for the 
sale of services by public utilities having no connec-
tion with this case." This is particularly so in view of 
the statement of the defendant in its Fourth Biennial 
Report quoted at page 19 of plaintiffs' brief as follows: 
"The Emergency Revenue Act, better 
known as the 'Sales Tax Act' has been in effect 
in this state since June 1, 1933. This Act im-
poses a two per cent tax on retail sales of tan-
gible personal property, certain service ren-
dered by public utilities, sales of meals, and 
the amount paid for admission to a place of 
amusement or recreation. * * *" ( Citalics 
added.) 
It is no answer to the proposition that the sale 
of services of the type rendered by these plaintiffs, 
viz., repair and maintenance services, is not taxable, 
to say that the sale of services is taxable when ren-
dered by certain public utilities. Yet this is one of 
the arguments to which the Defendant's Brief is de-
voted under point I. 
POINT II 
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT CITES AS AUTHORITY 
FOR THE TAXATION OF THE S~~ OF SERVICES, CER-
TAIN REGULATIONS WHICH D~1rHEIR TERMS, LEVY 
A TAX UPON THE SALE OF SERVICES. THESE ARE THE 
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VERY REGULATIONS WHOSE VALIDITY IS CALLED 
INTO QUESTION BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Under Point I of its brief, defendant seeks to 
answer the plaintiffs' contention that the portion of 
the Sales Tax Act with which this case is concerned is 
limited to a tax on the sale of tangible personal prop-
erty (a contention stated and re-stated by the defend-
ant in its Biennial Reports as quoted in plaintiffs' brief 
on pages 18 to 20 inclusive) by rna king the following 
statement: 
"The tax also applies to the sale of services 
where they cannot be or are not separated 
from the sale of tangible personal property. 
For example, where a furniture store sells 
furniture and agrees to deliver it without ad-
ditional charge, the store cannot deduct the 
cost of delivery from the selling price. A 
restaurant prepares meals and collects tax on 
the total price for the meal." 
The exa1nple of the restaurant comes under sub-
section 4 (c) of the Sales Tax Act and has no a pplica-
tion to transactions taxable under subsection 4 (a). 
The example of the delivery of furniture specifically 
refers to an instance vvhere no additional charge 
is made for the service of delivery. No tax is im-
posed on free service, and no one contends that the 
cost of furnishing service for ·which a merchant does 
not charge, for example air conditioning, the packag-
ing, free delivery, etc., can be deducted from the sales 
tax return. 
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In the case at bar, a customer may buy the sign 
at the cash sale price and make his own arrangement 
for maintenance and repair service on the sign, either 
with the plaintiffs or one of their competitors, or the 
customer may enter into a agreement with the com-
pany where the sum of the monthly payments he 
pays over the life of the contract consists of ( 1) the 
cash sale price (48.74% of the total contract price) 
and (2) the charge for maintaining and servicing 
the sign for the period of the contract ( 51.26% of the 
total contract price). (See stipulation 16, page 8 of 
plaintiffs' brief.) To claim that the transactions in 
the instant case, carefully delineated by stipulation, 
are in any way analagous to the free delivery ex-
ample given by defendant, is a misleading distortion. 
Reference is made by defendant to the provision 
of the rental agreement providing for liquidated 
damages in the amount of three-fourths of the un-
paid rental at the time of the breach of contract by 
the customer. Defendant then says: "The company 
tries to argue that only one-half the rentals paid 
constitute the fair selling price * * * This would 
seem to be inconsistent." 
In considering this contention of the defendant 
it should be noted: 
1. The plaintiffs don't try to argue that only 
one-half the rentals paid constitute the fair selling 
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price," the defendant stipulated that to be the fact. 
Stipulations 15 and 16 state: 
"15. The purpose of the amount in ex-
cess of the cash sale price charged the customer 
over the rental period is to compensate the 
company for servicing and maintaining the 
sign during the period, which servicing and 
maintaining includes the furnishing of parts 
and materials which are not separately taxed. 
In the case of a 36 months contract, approxi-
mately 39% of the total rental charged is for 
service and maintenance, including parts and 
materials, and in the case of a 60 months con-
tract, approximately 55% of the total rental 
charged is for service and maintenance, includ-
ing parts and materials. 
"16. An analysis of the rentals con-
tracted for during the entire period of this 
audit shows that the cash sales price was equal 
to 48.74% of the total amounts receivable for 
the signs to which said cash sales price applies. 
Or, stated conversely, the receipts for servicing 
and maintaining said signs, including parts 
and materials, during the period of the audit 
was 51.26% of the total amounts received from 
them during the original lease period." (Italics 
added) 
2. There is no inconsistency between the fact 
stipulated to and the liquidated damages provision. 
The provision setting liquidated damages at three-
fourths of the unpaid rentals is designed to approxi-
mate the damages the company will suffer by way 
of loss of profit, unrecovered costs expended, etc., the 
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ordinary components of damages for breach of con-
tract. Many Utah cases discuss liquidated damages 
and the proper components of them. By its terms, 
quoted by defendant, this provision encompasses 
those components. There is no relation between 
that figure and the breakdown in the charges between 
compensation for the sign itself (cash sale price) and 
compensation for repair and maintenance of the sign 
(the other 51.26% of the total rental ch~rged), nor 
is any relation intended. 
In many places throughout its brief, defendant 
confuses facts stipulated to by it with positions taken 
by the plaintiffs by way of argument. For example, 
on page 8 defendant makes the following statement: 
"In connection with the rewrite contracts 
this same form rental contract is used. They 
maintain that none of the rentals from rewrites 
should be taxable because it all represents 
maintenance but still they have the same pro-
vision for damages." (Italics added.) 
It is true that plaintiffs maintain that none of 
the rentals from re-writes should be taxable because 
it all represents maintenance. \Ve maintain it be-
cause it is the fact, a fact stipulated to by the defend-
ant as follows: 
"17. * * *The rental during that re-write 
period is for the purpose of compensating the 
company for maintaining and repairing the 
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sign, which includes the parts and materials, 
together with a reasonable profit." 
On pages 9 and 10 of defendant's brief is cited a 
number of examples from Sales Tax Regulation 58 
wherein the Tax Commission has levied and assessed 
sales tax on services rendered by certain contractors 
and installers in connection with the sale of their 
goods, unless the charge for the installation of the 
goods sold is separately stated on the invoice to the 
customer. That regulation is cited to prove that the 
Sales Tax [1 ct taxes services _unless the charge for 
them is separated on the invoice. This regulation 
proves nothing except that it has been promulgated. 
This regulation is one of the acts of the Commission 
which is by necessary implication under attack in 
this case and the issue is whether the Commission can, 
by regulation, tax the sale of services simply because 
of the manner of billing. 
The plaintiffs complain that the Commission 
seeks to tax charges for services (charges it expressly 
says are not subject to sales tax if made separately) 
on the basis that if they are included in a lump sum 
charge along with the sales price of the tangible 
personal property involved they become taxable. 
Where in the Sales Tax Act has the Legislature ab-
dicated its power to designate what may be taxed 
and what may not be? That the Commission has ex-
ercised that po\Nf'l" cannot be taken as proof that the 
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Sales Tax Act gave it the power, or that it exercised 
the power lawfully. 
In the instant case the Commission has repeated-
ly told the plaintiffs, "if you'll separate the 51.26% of 
your rental ch~rges which are for maintenance and 
repair from the 48.74% of your rental charges which 
are for the sales price of the sign, the maintenance 
and repair charges will not be taxed," presumably 
because they are not subject to sales tax under the 
Sales Tax Act (stipulation 25). Plaintiffs have 
answered that if those charges are not taxable under 
the Sales Tax Act when separated, they are not tax-
able under the Sales Tax Act when combined with the 
cash sales price charged for the sign. From the 
plaintiffs' books, as this audit and the stipulation 
clearly shows, it can be readily ascertained exactly 
what charges are for maintenance and repair service 
and what charges are· for the cash sale price of the 
sign. There is no administrative inconvenience or 
uncertainty whatsoever involved in this case. 
After arguing that "services" are subject to sales 
tax, the defendant states that· the Tax Comm~ssion 
has never attempted to tax them as such (page 11 
of defendant's brief). Surely the Tax Commission 
vvould levy a sales tax on "services" if the Sales Tax 
Act made them taxable. It would be the duty of the 
Commission to do so and it cannot be assumed that 
the Commission would wilfully fail to comply with 
its duty. 
10 
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POINT III 
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT IT HAS 
NOT LEVIED A TAX UPON SERVICES IN THE INSTANT 
CASE, WHEREAS, IT HAS IN FACT DONE SO. 
The defendant argues that, insofar as the pro-
ceeds from original rental agreements, re-writes and 
options are concerned, they do not seek to tax charges 
for ''services" because, by definition, "services" are 
acts performed for "another" and in the instant case 
the maintenance and repair labor is expended upon 
the plaintiffs' own signs. This argument is fallacious 
for two reasons; first, the defendant has stipulated 
that the charges it seeks to tax are charges for "ser-
vice," said, second, the charges made for keeping the 
signs in good working order are charges for labor 
performed for the benefit of "another," i.e., the 
customer. 
1. The defendant has stipulated that the 
charges it seeks to tax are charges for "service." This 
is shown by the following stipulation of fact: 
"1S. The purpose of the amount in ex-
cess of the cash sale price charged the customer 
over the rental period is to compensate the 
company for servicing and maintaining the 
sign during the period, which servicing and 
maintaining includes the furnishing of parts 
and materials which are not separately taxed. 
In the case of a 36 months contract, approxi-
mately 39% of the total rental charged is for 
11 
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service and maintenance, including parts and 
materials, and in the case of a 60 months con-
tract, approximately 55% of the total rental 
charged is for service and maintenance, includ-
ing parts and materials. 
In the face of the above stipulation by the de-
fendant it is hard for the plaintiffs to see how defend-
ant can seriously urge that the charge which is in-
volved in this case is not a charge for maintenance 
and repair "service." Again defendant seeks to con-
fuse the issue by stating that a fact stipulated to by it 
is merely a proposition urged by the plaintiffs. 
2. The charges made for keeping the sign in 
good working order are charges for labor performed 
for the benefit of "another," i.e., the customer. 
As is shown by stipulation 21, the sign manu-
factured for the customer is of use only to the 
customer for whom it is manufactured. He is the 
person to whom it is important that the sign operate 
properly and be maintained. As set forth in stip-
ulation 22 the sign has no salvage value to the com-
pany once it is installed. It has the same value to 
the company, that is, none, whether maint~ined and 
repaired or unmaintained and unrepaired. Lack of 
maintenance could not reduce its salvage value below 
the value stipulated, that is, below nothing. 
For whom then, is the labor and effort to. keep 
the signs in good running order and appearance ex-
12 
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pended? For the custmner upon whose place of busi-
ness the sign is placed. The labor of maintaining 
and repairing the sign is performed by the plaintiffs 
for the benefit of another~ the customer. Plaintiffs 
are then, performing and selling "services" under 
rental agreements, re-writes and options, as well as 
under maintenance contracts. 
As the stipulation of facts shows, a customer of 
these plaintiffs has several choices before him. He 
may buy the sign outright for its full cash sales price 
and thereafter have it rnaintained and repaired under 
a "mainte_nance contract," or he may enter into a 
rental contract for 36 to 60 months. As is the case 
if he purchases the sign, the customer has full use of 
the sign, but instead of having a substantial initial 
investment the customer has his payment of the 
cash sale price spread over the 36 to 60 month period 
in combination with his payments for maintenance. 
Under either system his cost is the same. C Stipulation 
2+.) 
True, at the expiration of the 36 to 60 month 
period involved in the rental agreement, the company 
owns the sign, not the customer. This would be a dis-
advantage ·were it not for the fact that the customer 
may continue ad infinitum to use the sign by simply 
paying for its maintenance under a "re-write" the 
same amount he would pay under a "maintenance 
contract." (Stipulations 17 and 18.) Since the sign 
13 
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has no salvage value to the company, once installed; 
and the company gets paid the same amount for the 
sign over the years whether the customer buys it 
and makes a maintenance contract or enters into a 
rental agreement with re-writes, the only material 
difference between the two methods is that so long 
as the company owns the sign it is assured of getting 
the maintenance work on it. Since the bulk of the 
company's work is maintenance work, this is inl-
portant to the company and it encourages the "rental 
agreement" method of acquiring the use of a sign by 
allowing the "cash sales price" to be spread over 
the whole original rental period without extra charge 
(stipulation 24) instead of requiring the cash sale 
price to be paid in full at the time the sign is manu-
factured as is the case with the "outright sale plus 
maintena~ce agreement" system. 
The company claims that the difference in form 
ought not to effect a different sales tax result between 
the two systems, and further claims that the sales 
tax act does not authorize a difference in treatment. 
The Commission has levied a sales tax on "ser-
vices" in the instant case and has done so purely on 
the basis of form instead of substance. 
All the plaintiffs ask is to receive the same 
consideration that is afforded ·funeral directors in 
P liminating from sales tax the charge made for 
1-t. 
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"services." The plaintiffs believe it is entitled to that 
consideration as a matter of lavv. 
POINT IV 
IN RELATION TO THE TAXATION OF CHARGES 
MADE UNDER "RE-WRITES," DEFENDANT SEEKS TO 
A VOID THE CLEAR MEANING AND INTENT OF ITS 
STIPULATION. 
On pages 16 and 17 of its brief the Commission 
makes the following statement relative to stipulation 
10. "-'• 
"Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation of Facts 
states that 'a maintenance agreement is exe-
cuted for a new term.' This is in fact a mis-
statement because the parties have agreed that 
a 'maintenance agreement' is one executed for 
the maintenance of a sign owned by the 
customer and is executed on the form found on 
page T-067 of the Transcript. The Stipulation, 
in the same paragraph 12, goes on to say, 'the 
agreements are on the same form as the orig-
inal rentals which is the form found at T-066, 
and are termed 're-writes' on the books of the 
company.' This is correct. It has never been 
stipulated that the re-writes are 'maintenance 
agreements.' " · 
The Commission has stipulated that "re-writes" 
are in substance and essence, though not in form, 
"maintenance agreenzents." When the following 
stipulations are read together, as they must be if the 
15 
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proper meaning of the whole of the stipulation is to be 
understood, the fact that a "re-write" is merely a 
"maintenance agreement" by another name-as the 
Commission stipulated-is made clear: 
"12. If the customer, at the end of the 
original rental period, desires to continue to 
use the sign, a maintenance agreement is exe-
cuted for a new term, on the basis of 50% of 
the original monthly charge. The agreements 
are on the same form as the original rentals 
and are termed "re-writes' on the books of the 
company. 
"17. During the re-write period, because 
of the increased age of the sign, the cost of 
maintaining the same is greater than the main-
tenance expense during the original rental 
period. The rental during that re-write period 
is for the purpose of compensating the com-
pany for maintaining and repairing the sign, 
which includes the parts and materials, to-
gether with a reasonable profit. 
"18. The entire cost of any signs placed 
vvith the customer under a rental agreement 
is amortized over the period of the original 
term of that agreement so that, at the expira-
tion of the original lease period the sign is com-
pletely written off as an asset of the company. 
At that time the company eliminates from the 
contract price for the rental of the sign that 
portion of the rental which it attributed to re-
covering the cash sale price and re-writes the 
contract at a price approximately equal to 
what would be charged for the service and 
16 
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maintenance of the sign, were it the property 
of the customer." 
Had it not been the intent and meaning of stipu-
lation 12 that a "re-write" is a "maintenance agree-
ment" in its essential nature, there would have been 
no reason for putting in the second sentence of stipu-
lation 12. That sentence points out that, although the 
re-write" is a "maintenance agreement," it is on a 
different form from the "maintenance agreement" 
used when the title to the sign is in the customer. 
On page 24 of its brief, defendant refers to the 
"de minimus" rule and states that it cannot apply 
when a sum as large as $39,1 0'7 .55 is concerned. The 
amount concerned is, at the most, 2% of $39,107.55, 
but the principle of the "de minimus" rule is that 
where the arriount under discussion is small in rela-
tion to the whole, it may be disregarded. It is a rule 
of relative values or importances. In the instant case, 
the cost of materials used in repair sales was 6% of 
the whole amount charged for repair sales. This is 
fixed by the defendant's own audit and the statement 
of facts agreed to by defendant. 
POINTV 
PLAINTIFFS AGREE WITH THE PROPOSITION SET 
FORTH AS THE DEFENDANT'S POINT III. 
Point III of the defendant's brief reads as follows: 
"Parts and materials used in the fulfilling 
17 
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of maintenance contracts are consu1ned by the 
company and tax should be paid on their cost 
of said parts and materials." 
This proposition must be read in connection with 
the portion of stipulation 7 which states: 
"It is agreed that the proper measure of 
the tax to be charged for the materials used 
in maintaining and repairing signs under 
maintenance agreements should be the same 
as is charged for those materials used under 
"repair sales." 
If the proper measure of the sales tax on mate-
rials used under maintenance agreements is two per 
cent of the cost of those materials .to the company, 
and it is stipulated that the tax to be charged for 
materials used in "repair sales" is to be the same, it 
would follow that the proper measure for the sales 
tax to be charged on materials used in "repair sales" 
is two per cent of the cost thereof. This agrees with 
plaintiffs arguments in Point IV of their brief, and is 
correct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' brief and in 
this reply brief, it is respectfully urged that the de-
cision of the court in this case be as prayed in plain-
tiffs' brief heretofore filed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER 
.·l ttorney for Plaintiffs 
18 
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